Secret Communication with Feedback by Gunduz, Deniz et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
81
2.
17
13
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
9 D
ec
 20
08
International Symposium on Information Theory and its Applications, ISITA2008
Auckland, New Zealand, 7-10, December, 2008
Secret Communication with Feedback
Deniz Gu¨ndu¨z†‡, D. Richard Brown III†† and H. Vincent Poor†
† Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08544.
‡ Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 94305.
†† Dept. of Electrical and Computer Eng., Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, 01609.
Abstract
Secure communication with feedback is studied. An
achievability scheme in which the backward channel
is used to generate a shared secret key is proposed.
The scenario of binary symmetric forward and back-
ward channels is considered, and a combination of the
proposed scheme and Maurer’s coding scheme is shown
to achieve improved secrecy rates. The scenario of a
Gaussian channel with perfect output feedback is also
analyzed and the Schalkwijk-Kailath coding scheme is
shown to achieve the secrecy capacity for this channel.
1. Introduction
In his pioneering work [1], Shannon introduced in-
formation theoretic security and defined perfect se-
crecy, which roughly refers to the case in which an
enciphered cryptogram does not reveal any informa-
tion to an eavesdropper about the underlying secret
message. Shannon proved that perfect secrecy can be
achieved with a shared secure key that is as long as
the underlying message. Wyner showed in [2] that per-
fect secrecy can be achieved even without key distri-
bution if the cryptogram is transmitted over a noisy
broadcast channel in which the eavesdropper’s channel
is physically degraded with respect to the legitimate re-
ceiver’s channel. This result was extended to more gen-
eral broadcast channels in [3], where it was shown that
nonzero secrecy capacity can be achieved if the main
channel is less noisy than the eavesdropper’s channel.
Secure communication in the presence of eavesdroppers
has gained a recent interest, and information theoretic
security in various models has been explored in detail
(see, for example, [4], [5], [6] and [7]).
While it is well-known that feedback doesn’t in-
crease the capacity of a point-to-point memoryless
channel, it was observed in [8] that the availability of
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feedback might increase the secrecy capacity of a point-
to-point memoryless channel. This can be immediately
seen by considering an infinite capacity secure feed-
back link from the legitimate receiver to the legitimate
transmitter. The feedback link can be used to trans-
mit a secure key. This secure key can then be used to
transmit the message securely over the forward channel
via the one-time-pad coding scheme. Hence, an infinite
capacity secure feedback channel allows the system to
achieve a secrecy capacity equal to the forward chan-
nel capacity as if the eavesdropper is not present. It
is observed in [9], [10] that even public communication
between the legitimate users can enhance the secrecy
capacity. It has been shown that positive secrecy ca-
pacity can be achieved through public communication
even if the eavesdropper’s forward channel is less noisy.
In [9] and [10] upper and lower bounds for the per-
fect secrecy capacity are provided in the case of public
communication. These bounds match only for certain
special cases. A feedback jamming scheme is also de-
scribed in [11] for modulo additive channels.
In this paper, we first propose an achievable secrecy
scheme for a general wiretap channel model with feed-
back (see Fig. 1), in which the forward channel from
Alice to Bob and Eve and the backward channel from
Bob to Alice and Eve are orthogonal broadcast chan-
nels. The achievability of the proposed scheme follows
from using the backward channel for generating a secret
key shared by Alice and Bob and then using this secret
key to transmit the message securely over the forward
channel via the one-time-pad coding scheme. We then
apply this secrecy scheme, in conjunction with Mau-
rer’s feedback coding technique [9], to a scenario with
independent binary symmetric forward and backward
channels. We explicitly describe the achievable secrecy
rates of the proposed scheme and show the improve-
ments in secrecy rate achieved with respect he feedback
scheme for binary symmetric channels proposed in [12].
In the second part of this paper, we consider se-
cret communication through a Gaussian wiretap chan-
nel with perfect channel output feedback, i.e., Bob’s
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Figure 1: Wiretap channel with noisy feedback channel
whose output can also be observed by the eavesdropper.
noisy channel output is perfectly available to Alice in
a casual manner. This system is consistent with the
model considered in the Schalkwijk-Kailath (SK) [13]
scheme, where perfect causal feedback was shown to
greatly simplify the achievability of the point-to-point
link from Alice to Bob and also improve the error expo-
nent by exploiting the perfect feedback link in this sce-
nario. The SK scheme is a simple deterministic scheme
which is easy to implement and analyze as opposed to
Shannon theoretic random coding involving long code-
words and high complexity encoding/decoding. We
show that, in addition to all these attractive proper-
ties, the SK scheme also achieves the secrecy capacity
in the presence of an eavesdropper when the eavesdrop-
per (Eve) receives a noisy observation of the feedback
from Bob in addition to her own channel output from
Alice as depicted in Fig. 4.
In the rest of the paper, we use Xn and Xni to
denote the sequences (X1, . . . , Xn) and (Xi, . . . , Xn),
respectively. We also define [x]+ = max{x, 0}.
2. System Model and Definitions
In the system shown in Fig. 1, Alice wants to trans-
mit a message W ∈ W to Bob over the discrete mem-
oryless broadcast channel p(yf , zf |xf ), where Xf ∈ Xf
is Alice’s channel input and Yf ∈ Yf and Zf ∈ Zf
are the outputs at Bob and Eve, respectively. There
is also an independent feedback channel p(yb, zb|xb),
where Xb ∈ Xb is Bob’s feedback channel input and
Yb ∈ Yb and Zb ∈ Zb are the outputs at Alice and
Eve, respectively. Here, subscripts ‘f ’ and ‘b’ represent
forward and backward channels, respectively.
Definition 2.1 A (2nR, n) code for the above feed-
back channel is composed of a message W uniformly
distributed over set W = {1, . . . , 2nR}, stochastic en-
coders at Alice fi : W × Y
i−1
b → Xf which map the
message and the previous feedback outputs to the i-th
channel input, and stochastic feedback encoders at Bob
gi : Y
i−1
f × X
i−1
b → Xb which map previous chan-
nel outputs and the feedback inputs to the i-th feed-
back input, i = 1, . . . , n, and finally a decoder at Bob
h : Ynf × X
n
b → W, which maps the channel outputs
and the feedback inputs of Bob to the decoded message
Wˆ .
As usual, the block error probability of a code is
defined as
Pne =
1
2nR
2nR∑
W=1
Pr{Wˆ 6=W}, (1)
while the equivocation rate is defined as
Rne =
1
n
H(W |Znf , Z
n
b ). (2)
Definition 2.2 A secrecy rate R is achievable if there
exists a sequence of (2nR, n) codes for which Pne → 0
as n goes to infinity and the equivocation rate satisfies
R ≤ lim
n→∞
Rne .
Definition 2.3 The secrecy capacity Csf in the pres-
ence of feedback is the highest achievable rate R.
3. An Achievable Secrecy Rate
In the following theorem, we give a lower bound to
the secrecy capacity in the presence of feedback. The
achievability follows from using the backward channel
for generating a secret key shared by Alice and Bob,
and then using this secret key in the forward channel
to increase the secrecy capacity of the forward channel.
Theorem 3.1 Rate Rs is achievable if,
0 ≤ Rs ≤ min{I(Vf ;Yf ), I(Vf ;Yf |Uf )− I(Vf ;Zf |Uf)
+I(Vb;Yb)− I(Vb;Zb)},
for some auxiliary random variables Uf , Vf , and
Vb satisfying I(Uf ;Zf) ≥ I(Uf ;Yf ) with a joint
distribution p(vb, xb, yb, zb, uf , vf , xf , yf , zf) = p(vb)
·p(xb|vb)p(yb, zb|xb)p(uf )p(vf |uf)p(xf |vf )p(yf , zf |xf ),
i.e., Uf → Vf → Xf → (Yf , Zf) and
Vb → Xb → (Yb, Zb).
Proof: The achievability scheme is based on a sep-
aration approach in the sense that, Bob uses the back-
ward channel to generate a shared secret key of rate
Rk, and then this shared key is used to transmit the
message W over the direct channel. We can utilize a
block based coding structure, where a secure key is gen-
erated in the i-th block, i = 1, . . . , B, and used in block
i + 1, and the desired rate is achieved in the limit of
infinite blocks, i.e., as B →∞.
For simplicity, we give the proof for a con-
stant Uf . Also, for given PVfXfYfZf , one
can consider an auxiliary channel PXf |Vf and
the code for the induced channel PYfZf |Vf =∑
xf
PXf |Vf (xf |vf )PYfZf |Xf (yf , zf |xf ). Hence, we
prove the achievability of min{I(Xf ;Yf ), I(Xf ;Yf ) −
I(Xf ;Zf ) + I(Vb;Yb) − I(Vb;Zb)}. The more general
proof follows as in [3]. It is possible to generate a secret
key Wk at rate
Rk , min{[I(Vb;Yb)− I(Vb;Zb)]
+, I(Xf ;Zf )}.
over the backward channel [3]. From the perspective of
the forward channel, the problem is now equivalent to
finding the secrecy capacity of the broadcast channel
with a secret key of rate Rk.
Let R1 , I(Xf ;Yf ) − I(Xf ;Zf). Gener-
ate 2nI(Xf ;Yf ) codewords independent identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) with probability p(xnf ) =
∏n
i=1 p(xfi),
and partition these codewords into 2nR1 codebooks
which we name as C1, . . . , C2nR1 . Further divide each
subcodebook Ci into 2
nRk smaller codebooks, which
are named as Ci,1, . . . , Ci,2nRk . For each message w =
[w1, w2], where w1 ∈ [1, 2
nR1 ] and w2 ∈ [1, 2
nRk ], first
generate w′2 = w2 ⊕ wk mod(2
nRk), and transmit a
codeword chosen uniformly random from the codebook
Cw1,w′2 . Bob can correctly find (w1, w
′
2), hence w1 using
the secret key, with high probability for large enough n.
On the other hand, Eve can determine w′2 and the code-
word index within the smallest codebook, but cannot
receive any information about w1. Moreover, no infor-
mation about w2 is revealed to Eve as well, because w
′
2
is uniformly distributed and independent of w2.
Corollary 3.2 If Bob’s channel in the forward direc-
tion and Alice’s channel in the backward direction are
both less noisy then Eve’s, the highest secrecy rate
achievable by the proposed scheme in Theorem 3.1 can
be simplified as
Rs ≤ min{I(Xf ;Yf ), I(Xf ;Yf )− I(Xf ;Zf)
+ I(Xb;Yb)− I(Xb;Zb)},
for a joint distribution of the form p(xb) p(yb, zb|xb)
p(xf ) p(yf , zf |xf ).
4. Secrecy Rates for the Binary Symmetric
Wiretap Channel with Feedback
In this section, we focus on the secrecy rates when
both the forward and the backward channels in Fig. 1
are independent binary symmetric channels (BSCs).
The system model in this case is fully characterized
by the four crossover probabilities ǫf , δf , ǫb, and δb,
corresponding to the channels Alice→Bob, Alice→Eve,
Bob→Alice, and Bob→Eve, respectively.
This model is also analyzed in [12] in which a se-
crecy rate based on the transmission scheme proposed
by Maurer in [9] is proposed: a random binary sequence
xnb is transmitted by Bob over the backward channel.
Assuming Alice’s coded message is vn, she transmits
the modulo sum of vn with the received signal from
the backward channel, i.e., xnf = v
n⊕ ynb . If we assume
that Alice can transmit xnf over a noiseless channel,
then Bob can reconstruct vn ⊕ ynb ⊕ x
n
b , while the best
Eve can do is to reconstruct vn⊕ynb ⊕z
n
b . This is equiv-
alent to a broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve
with cross-over probabilities ǫb and ǫb + δb − 2ǫbδb, re-
spectively.
We propose here to use a combination of Maurer’s
scheme with the proposed scheme in Section 3. The
maximum secret key rate that can be generated using
the feedback channel is Cbs , [h(δb)−h(ǫb)]
+. Bob uses
the first αn channel uses to generate a secret key of rate
αCbs , where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is a design parameter that can
be optimized according to the crossover probabilities in
order to maximize the total secrecy rate. Bob transmits
random bits in the rest of the feedback channel uses.
In the forward channel, we first consider the case
ǫf < δf . Alice divides the secret message into three
parts, all of which are transmitted simultaneously. In
the first part, Alice transmits a secret message of rate
Rs1 = h(δf )− h(ǫf )
over the forward channel using the usual secret coding
scheme. Alice can simultaneously transmit a message
at rate 1 − h(ǫf ) − R
s
1 = 1 − h(δf ), which can be re-
ceived by both Bob and Eve. Alice uses the secure key
from the feedback channel as a one-time-pad to trans-
mit securely to Bob at rate
Rs2 = min{1− h(δf ), αC
b
s}.
The remaining capacity of the forward channel is then
1 − h(δf ) − R
s
2 = [1 − h(δf ) − αC
b
s ]
+. Finally, at this
rate, Alice transmits a modulo summed message in the
same manner as [12], using the random bits received
from the second portion of the feedback channel. This
transmission occurs at rate
Rs3 = min
{
[1− h(δf )− αC
b
s ]
+, (1− α)
}
·(h(ǫb + δb − 2ǫbδb)− h(ǫb))
In the case when ǫf ≥ δf , it is impossible to have secret
communication without feedback, hence Rs1 = 0. It is
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Figure 2: Achievable secrecy rate of the proposed feed-
back scheme with optimized α in binary symmetric
channels.
straightforward to show in this case that Rs2 = min{1−
h(ǫf ), αC
b
s} and R
s
3 = min{[1 − h(ǫf) − αC
b
s ]
+, (1 −
α)}(h(ǫb+ δb− 2ǫbδb)−h(ǫb)). In both cases, the total
secrecy capacity is then Rs1 +R
s
2 +R
s
3.
To illustrate the gains through the proposed feed-
back technique, we consider a system model with the
same crossover probability in the forward and backward
channels, i.e. ǫ = ǫf = ǫb and δ = δf = δb. In Fig. 2,
we plot the achievable secrecy rate by the proposed
transmission scheme with optimized α as a function of
ǫ and δ. As opposed to not having feedback, or us-
ing the whole feedback link to generate a secret key,
this scheme can achieve positive secrecy rates even in
δ > ǫ as we have partially incorporated Maurer’s cod-
ing scheme. Note also that, our achievable secrecy rates
improve upon the ones reported in [12].
Figure 3 plots the improvement in the secrecy rate
of the proposed feedback scheme with respect to the se-
crecy capacity without feedback. Note that the secrecy
capacity without feedback is Cs = [h(δ)−h(ǫ)]
+. Inter-
estingly, the largest gain is obtained at the point ǫ = 0
and h(δ) = 12 , or δ ≈ 0.11. At this point the secrecy
rate without feedback is Cs =
1
2 , while with feedback
we achieve Csf = 1, an improvement of one half bit.
As δ → 12 from this point, the secrecy capacity without
feedback increases towards one and feedback results in
less improvement.
5. Gaussian Wiretap Channel with Perfect
Feedback
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Figure 3: Improvement in secrecy rate of the proposed
feedback scheme with optimized α in binary symmet-
ric channels with respect to secrecy capacity without
feedback.
Here, we consider a Gaussian wire-tap channel with
feedback as seen in Fig. 4. The forward channel at time
index i is modeled as
Yi = Xi +Ni and Zi = Xi +Mi,
in which Ni and Mi are additive white jointly Gaus-
sian noise terms with zero means. There is also an
average power constraint P on Alice’s transmission.
We also have a perfect feedback channel from Bob’s
output to Alice that operates causally, i.e., at time in-
stant i, Alice knows Bob’s previous channel outputs
Y i−1 = {Y1, . . . , Yi−1}. Eve, on the other hand, can
only observe a noisy version of this feedback. The
feedback from Bob to Alice, as overheard by Eve, is
modeled as
Y¯i = Yi + Si, (3)
at time i, where Si is also white Gaussian with zero
mean. We allow correlation among the additive noise
terms of the network at each time instant. The covari-
ance matrix of the noise terms N,M and S is defined
as
C ,

 σ
2
N ρ1σNσM ρ2σNσS
ρ1σNσM σ
2
M ρ3σMσS
ρ2σNσS ρ3σMσS σ
2
S


which is a real, non-negative definite matrix with σ2M >
0, σ2S > 0 and |ρi| < 1, for i = 1, 2, 3.
Alice’s (potentially stochastic) encoding functions
are now defined as fi :W×Y
i−1 → X . We do not have
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Figure 4: The Gaussian wiretap channel with perfect
feedback to the legitimate transmitter.
a channel encoder at Bob, and the perfect feedback
scenario is equivalent to having Xb,i = Yb,i = Yi and
Zb,i = Y¯i. The average probability of error and the
equivocation rate are as defined in Section 2.
Ignoring the eavesdropper, the capacity from Al-
ice to Bob (with or without feedback) is Cf =
1
2 log
(
1 + P
σ2
N
)
. This also serves as an upper bound
on the secrecy capacity with feedback. The secrecy ca-
pacity when there is no feedback is given by [8]
Cs =
1
2
[
log
(
1 +
P
σ2N
)
− log
(
1 +
P
σ2M
)]+
. (4)
Note that Cs = 0 if σ
2
N ≥ σ
2
M .
In [13], Schalkwijk and Kailath proposed a com-
munication scheme (the SK scheme) for a Gaussian
channel with perfect feedback that achieves the chan-
nel capacity. The SK scheme is based on deterministic
coding and parameter estimation. We first give a brief
overview of the SK scheme using the notation of [14].
In the SK scheme, 2nR messages are mapped to
a signal point by dividing the interval [−0.5, 0.5] into
2nR equally spaced subintervals. The mid-point of each
subinterval corresponds to a message. Let θ be the
signal point corresponding to the underlying message.
At the first transmission, X1 = α1θ is transmitted, and
Y1 = α1θ+N1 is received where α1 is a constant to be
chosen. The receiver forms an estimate of θ based on
its observation as
θˆ1 = Xˆ1 =
Y1
α1
= θ +
N1
α1
. (5)
The transmitter can also compute this estimate using
the perfect feedback signal, and in the next transmis-
sion, it transmits the estimation error at the receiver,
i.e., X2 = α2(θ − θˆ1) = −α2
N1
α1
, where α2 is another
pre-determined constant. The receiver computes
Xˆ2 =
Y2
α2
+
Y1
α1
= θ +
N2
α2
. (6)
Using the two independent observations of θ in (5)
and (6), the receiver forms θˆ2 the maximum likelihood
(ML) estimate of θ. Then the transmitter transmits
X3 = α3(θ − θˆ2), where α3 is another pre-determined
constant. Repeating this process, we have
Xi = αi(θ − θˆi−1), (7)
Xˆi = θˆi−1 +
Yi
αi
, and (8)
θˆi =
∑i
j=1 α
2
jXˆj∑i
j=1 α
2
j
(9)
where (9) is the maximum likelihood (ML) estimate
of the parameter θ at Bob from the observations
Y [1], . . . , Y [i].
Now, on choosing αi = γα
i−1 with γ =
√
P/σ2N
and α1 = α =
√
P+σ2
N
σ2
N
, it can be shown that the error
variance after n iterations is E[(θ − θˆn)
2] =
σ2N
α2n
. For
M = 2nR, the probability of error, which corresponds
to the probability of θˆn falling outside of the message
interval, can be shown to decay to zero exponentially.
In the following theorem, we show that the SK
scheme also achieves the optimal secrecy capacity.
Theorem 5.1 For the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) wire-tap channel with perfect feedback to the
transmitter, the secrecy capacity is given by
Csf = Cf =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
σ2N
)
, (10)
and this capacity can be achieved by the SK scheme.
Proof: The converse is obvious since the rate in
(10) is the capacity of the feedback channel without
secrecy constraints. Here we prove the achievability of
the secrecy capacity in (10) by the SK scheme.
Fix W = {1, . . . , 2nR}, where R = Csf − ǫ, for some
ǫ > 0. Then we know that the average error probability
goes to zero as n → ∞ for any ǫ > 0 with the SK
scheme.
From the SK scheme, we can observe that
θˆi = θ +
∑i
j=1 αjNj∑i
j=1 α
2
j
, and (11)
Xi = −αi
∑i−1
j=1 αjNj∑i−1
j=1 α
2
j
= hi
i−1∑
j=1
αjNj (12)
where we have defined hi , −
αi∑
i−1
j=1
α2
j
. The observa-
tions at Eve are then given as Z1 = α1θ +M1 and
Zi = αi
i−1∑
j=1
hjNj +Mi, for i = 2, . . . , n. (13)
Finally, the equivocation rate can be written as
H(θ|Zn1 ,Y¯
n
1 ) ≥ H(θ|Z
n
1 , Y¯
n
1 ,M
n
2 ), (14)
= H(θ|α1θ +M1, α1θ + S1, S
n
2 , N
n,Mn2 ),
= H(θ|α1θ +M1, α1θ + S1, N1), (15)
where (14) follows from the fact that conditioning re-
duces entropy and (15) follows since Nn2 and M
n
2 are
independent of both θ and α1θ+M1 due to i.i.d. chan-
nel assumption.
The equivocation rate can be further simplified as
H(θ|Zn1 , Y¯
n
1 ) ≥ H(θ|α1θ +M1, α1θ + S1, N1),
= H(θ)− I(θ;α1θ +M1, α1θ + S1, N1),
= nR− I(θ;α1θ +M1, α1θ + S1, N1),
= nR− I(θ;Aθ +B),
where A , [0, α1, α1]
T , B , [N1,M1, S1]
T , and where
we have used the fact that the message is uniform over
the set {1, . . . , 2nR}. The mutual information term in
the final expression is difficult to calculate for a uni-
formly distributed discrete θ, but we know that, al-
lowing for an arbitrary distribution for θ, the mutual
information is maximized for a Gaussian input distri-
bution that has the same variance as θ. The variance
of θ as n goes to infinity is 112 , hence the corresponding
mutual information upper bound is given by
I(θ;Aθ +B) ≤
1
2
log det
(
I+
1
12
AATE[BBT ]−1
)
=
1
2
log det
(
I+
1
12
AATC−1
)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
α21c1
12σ2Sσ
2
M c2
)
(16)
where
c1 , 2(ρ3 − ρ1ρ2)σSσM + (ρ
2
1 − 1)σ
2
M + (ρ
2
3 − 1)σ
2
S and
c2 , ρ
2
1 + ρ
2
2 + ρ
2
3 − 2ρ1ρ2ρ3 − 1.
Overall, we obtain
1
n
H(θ|Zn1 , Y¯
n
1 ) ≥ R −
1
2n
log
(
1 +
α21c1
12c2σ2Sσ
2
M
)
= Csf − ǫ−
1
2n
log
(
1 +
α21c1
12c2σ2Sσ
2
M
)
→ Cfs (17)
as n→∞ and ǫ→ 0, if σ2M > 0, σ
2
S > 0 and c2 6= 0.
Note that, when there is no feedback, the secrecy
capacity is nonzero only if σ2N < σ
2
M . However, our re-
sult shows that even if the eavesdropper’s channel is less
noisy than that of the legitimate receiver, the secrecy
capacity can be made positive via perfect feedback.
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